

---

# **Modern Latin America, Sixth Edition**

*Thomas E. Skidmore*  
*Peter H. Smith*

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**

---

Modern  
Latin America

---

*This page intentionally left blank*

---



# Modern Latin America

SIXTH EDITION

*Thomas E. Skidmore*  
*Peter H. Smith*

New York Oxford  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
2005

---

Oxford University Press

Oxford New York  
Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai  
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata  
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai  
Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

Copyright © 1984, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.  
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016  
www.oup.com

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,  
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,  
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,  
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Skidmore, Thomas E.  
Modern Latin America / by Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith.—6th ed.  
p. cm.  
Includes bibliographical references and index.  
ISBN 0-19-517013-X (paper)—ISBN 0-19-517012-1 (cloth)  
I. Latin America—History. I. Smith, Peter H. II. Title.

F1413.S55 2004  
980—dc22

2004043455

Printing number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America  
on acid-free paper

---

*For*  
*David, James, and Robert*  
*and*  
*Jonathan, Peter, Sasha, and Amanda*

---

*This page intentionally left blank*

---



# Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xiii
PROLOGUE. WHY LATIN AMERICA?	1
Interpretations of Latin America	5
Analytical Themes in This Book	10
ONE. THE COLONIAL FOUNDATIONS, 1492–1880s	13
The European Context	14
Spanish America: From Conquest to Colony, 1492–1600	15
Spanish America: The Transformation of Colonial Society, 1600–1750	21
Portuguese America: A Different World?	22
The Roots of Independence	26
The Colonial Response	29
Achieving Independence	32
The Brazilian Path to Independence	34
The Aftermath of Independence, 1830–1850	36
The Pull of the International Economy, 1850–1880s	40
TWO. THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN LATIN AMERICA, 1880s–2000s	42
Phase 1: Initiation of Export-Import Growth, 1880–1900	43
Phase 2: Expansion of Export-Import Growth, 1900–1930	47
Phase 3: Import-Substituting Industrialization, 1930–1960s	51
Phase 4: Stagnation in Import-Substituting Growth, 1960s–1980s	55
Phase 5: Crisis, Debt, and Democracy, 1980s–2000s	58
Women and Society	62
A Framework for Comparison	67



THREE. ARGENTINA: PROSPERITY, DEADLOCK, AND CHANGE	69
The Struggle over Nationhood	69
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	71
Rhythms of Popular Culture	77
The Political System: Consensus and Reform	80
The Military Turns Back the Clock	82
Peronism and Perón	86
The Military Stewardship	89
The Failure of Developmental Reformism	91
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Solution	94
Peronists Back in Power	96
The Military Returns	98
Transition to Democracy	101
FOUR. CHILE: SOCIALISM, REPRESSION, AND DEMOCRACY	109
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	110
Politics and Parliament	114
From Instability to Popular Front	118
The Era of Party Politics	122
Socialism via Democracy?	127
The Pinochet Regime	133
Redemocratization	136
FIVE. BRAZIL: DEVELOPMENT FOR WHOM?	139
Dom Pedro I (1822–1831)	139
Dom Pedro II (1840–1889)	143
The End of the Empire	144
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	147
The First Republic (1889–1930)	153
Getúlio Vargas and the <i>Estado Novo</i>	157
The Second Republic (1946–1964)	163
Military Rule	171
The Quest for Afro-Brazilian Identity	174
From Liberalization to Redemocratization	175
Brazil's First Working-Class President	179
SIX. PERU: SOLDIERS, OLIGARCHS, AND INDIANS	181
The Independence Period	183
The Guano Age	185
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	189
Oligarchic Rule	196

Leguía: The <i>Oncenio</i>	198	
The Reformist Critique	200	
Flirting with Alternatives	202	
Economic Liberalism and Political Vacillation	205	
The Military Revolution	208	
Struggles of Civilian Governments	213	
Fujimori's Illiberal Democracy	217	
Perils of Politics	219	
SEVEN. COLOMBIA: DISCORD, CIVILITY, AND VIOLENCE		221
Independence and Its Aftermath	223	
Bolívar's Gran Colombia: An Experiment Failed	225	
Forming Political Parties: Liberals and Conservatives	226	
Rafael Núñez and the Politics of Regeneration	228	
The Loss of Panama	229	
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	231	
Conservatives, Liberals, and <i>Convivencia</i>	236	
Gaitán, Reaction, and <i>La Violencia</i>	240	
The National Front	243	
Seeking Constitutional Order	246	
EIGHT. MEXICO: THE TAMING OF A REVOLUTION		254
Mexico After Independence	254	
The North American Invasion	257	
Reform, Monarchy, and the Restored Republic	258	
The Díaz Era: Progress at a Price	260	
The Mexican Revolution	264	
Institutionalizing the Revolution	269	
Stability, Growth—and Rigidity	274	
North American Free Trade	287	
Twilight of the Technocrats?	290	
Dawn of a New Era	292	
NINE. CUBA: LATE COLONY, FIRST SOCIALIST STATE		296
Dubious Independence	298	
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	298	
Politics: Corruption and Decay	302	
Americanization in Pre-revolutionary Cuba	304	
Fidel Castro and the Making of the Revolution	305	
Defining the Revolution	309	
Decade of Experiment	315	
Consolidating the Regime	318	
The Struggle for Survival	322	

TEN. THE CARIBBEAN: COLONIES AND MINI-STATES	328
The Colonial Period: Conquest and Competition	330
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	332
Haiti: Slave Republic, Voodoo Dictatorship	335
The Dominican Republic: Unfinished Experiment	341
Jamaica: Runaways and Revolutionary Socialism	345
Puerto Rico: From Settler Colony to Capitalist Showcase	347
Lesser Antilles: Struggle of the Micro-States	351
ELEVEN. CENTRAL AMERICA: COLONIALISM, DICTATORSHIP, AND REVOLUTION	356
Colonial Background	356
Independence: The Struggle for Unification	359
Rafael Carrera and Conservative Supremacy	360
Liberal Theory and "Republican Dictatorships"	362
Overview: Economic Growth and Social Change	363
Panama: A Nation and a Zone	367
Costa Rica: The Exceptional Democracy	371
Nicaragua: From Dynasty to Revolution	373
Honduras: The Military in Politics	380
El Salvador: From Stability to Insurgence	382
Guatemala: Reaction and Repression	389
TWELVE. LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD	396
From Independence to Pan Americanism	398
The Rise of U.S. Influence	402
The Consolidation of U.S. Influence	405
Expressions of U.S. Power	409
The Nationalist Impulse	414
The Revolutionary Threat	417
Democratic Reformers and the Alliance for Progress	421
Development and Debt	424
The End of the Cold War	427
Regional Economic Integration	428
The Intermestic Agenda	432
Hispanic Culture and Communities	434
Prospects for the Twenty-First Century	438
EPILOGUE. WHAT FUTURE FOR LATIN AMERICA?	440
Dimensions of Change: Demography and Economics	442
Looking Ahead: Political Responses	445
Closing the Socialist Route	448
The Prospects for Development Under Capitalism	449

What Will Happen to the Non-European Cultures in Latin America?	452
Latin America's Contribution to the World	453
STATISTICAL APPENDIX	456
ANALYTICAL APPENDIX	460
HEADS OF STATE	471
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING	480
INDEX	495

---

*This page intentionally left blank*

---

# Acknowledgments

For this sixth edition we have updated our interpretation of modern Latin American history in the context of a rapidly changing international environment. The end of the Cold War has removed one of the defining characteristics of post-1945 Latin America and brought new issues to the forefront of the inter-American agenda, among them free trade, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. Concern with economic restructuring (on neo-liberal lines) has focused attention on age-old questions of poverty, inequality, and social justice. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have transformed not only global politics but also prospects for hemispheric cooperation.

The continuation of civilian rule has given reason for hope that Latin America may yet succeed in overcoming the fateful historical legacy outlined in this book. At issue is not only the consolidation of democracy but also the extent and quality of democratic governance.

For work on this sixth edition we would like to acknowledge the assistance of Scott Bailey, Nicole Bush, and Mónica Pachón. Heather M. Smith composed the index.

We express special thanks to Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, distinguished colleagues who graciously reviewed and greatly improved our chapter on Colombia; any errors that remain belong to us alone.

Once again we welcome comments and suggestions from readers.

*Providence, Rhode Island*  
*La Jolla, California*

T. E. S.  
P. H. S.

---

*This page intentionally left blank*

---

Modern  
Latin America



---

*This page intentionally left blank*

## WHY LATIN AMERICA?

“The U.S. will do anything for Latin America, except read about it,” according to James Reston, for many years the dean of U.S. political commentators. Is there any reason why we should try to prove him wrong? There are several. First, our nation’s economic interests are deeply involved in the region. Latin America is one of our major trading partners. It is the site of much U.S. investment and a source for oil and other critical raw materials. An acceleration of growth in key countries—such as Mexico and Brazil—may soon produce significant new powers on the world scene.

We also have political links. Revolutionary upheavals and repressive responses in Latin America directly challenge U.S. foreign policy. They raise difficult questions about how to protect and promote U.S. national interests (defined as not simply economic or strategic interests). Ronald Reagan dramatized this fact shortly after his 1980 election by meeting with Mexican President José López Portillo on the U.S.-Mexican border, in what was the U.S. president’s first such conference with any other head of state. President George W. Bush made a similar choice in 2001, selecting Mexican President Vicente Fox as his first contact with a foreign head of state. President George Bush (senior) sought a special relationship with Mexico and proposed a free-trade agreement that would tighten economic bonds between all of Latin America and the United States. His successor and political rival, President Bill Clinton, followed up the free-trade initiative by hosting a hemispheric “Summit of the Americas” in Miami in December 1994. Bush (junior) continued the initiative by pressing for the approval of a so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005.

There is another important consideration closer to home. Large sections of our country have become Latinized by the influence of migrants from Mexico, Puerto Rico, Central America, the Caribbean, and even Brazil. This is in addition to the Hispanic descendants of the original Spanish-speaking population of the formerly Mexican Southwest. Migration, both historical and recent, then brought peoples and customs from Latin America to the American Southwest (from Texas to California), Florida, and New York. Many major U.S. cities now have more children from Spanish-

speaking families than from any other group. Bilingualism has become a political issue forcing us to rethink the meaning of Spanish-speaking America, both within our borders and beyond.

Most U.S. citizens (or “North Americans,” as we are commonly called in Latin America) know little about our neighboring societies to the south. Many believe that the United States can impose its will on the region through “big-stick” diplomacy or military might. Others do not even care. Looking for an “easy” foreign language, high school or college students choose Spanish and then assume everything associated with speaking Spanish must be “easy.” Such ignorance can be dangerous, and one purpose of this book is to help reduce misinformation. In fact, this lack of knowledge is felt just as keenly in West Europe. British journalists are alleged to have once had a contest to think up the most boring newspaper headline imaginable (it had to be real and actually printed) and they came up with “Small Earthquake in Chile: Not Many Dead.” Chile’s complex history over the last forty years puts that provincialism into painful relief.

By training and outlook, most North Americans and Europeans search for intellectual formulae that will yield clear-cut answers to our inquiries:

#### U.S. Stereotypes of Latin America

On December 10, 1940, the Office of Public Opinion Research conducted a nation-wide poll in which respondents were given a card with nineteen words on it and were asked to indicate those words that seemed to describe best the people of Central and South America. The results were as follows:

Dark-skinned	80%	Imaginative	23%
Quick-tempered	49%	Shrewd	16%
Emotional	47%	Intelligent	15%
Religious	45%	Honest	13%
Backward	44%	Brave	12%
Lazy	41%	Generous	12%
Ignorant	34%	Progressive	11%
Suspicious	32%	Efficient	5%
Friendly	30%	No answer	4%
Dirty	28%	No opinion	0%
Proud	26%		

Since respondents were asked to pick as many descriptive terms as they liked, percentages add to considerably more than 100.

From John J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 18; Hadley Cantril ed., *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 502.

the “Latin lover,” the “Frito Bandito,” the soulful Che Guevara, the Brazilian mulatta carnival queens—these are the images that often first come to mind. But when we move beyond these caricatures (which have their own truth to tell), we find Latin America to be a complex region.

Latin America is not an easy place to understand, despite the fact that the same language, Spanish, is spoken everywhere—except Brazil (Portuguese), part of the Andes (Quechua and other Indian languages), the Caribbean (French, English, and Dutch), Mexico (scattered pockets of Indian languages), and Guatemala (over twenty Indian languages). Latin America covers a vast variety of people and places. Geographically, Latin America includes the land mass extending from the Rio Grande border between Texas and Mexico to the southern tip of South America, plus some Caribbean islands: a total area two and one-half times the size of the United States. Brazil itself is larger than the continental United States.

Physical features present sharp differences: from the Andean mountain range, stretching the full length of western South America, to the tropical forest of the Amazon basin; from the arid plains of northern Mexico to the fertile grasslands of the Argentine pampa. The people of Latin America contain elements and mixtures of three racial groups—native Indians, white Europeans, and black Africans. By 2001 the total population came to 524 million, compared with 285 million in the United States.

Latin American society displays startling contrasts—between rich and poor, between city and country, between learned and illiterate, between the powerful lord of the hacienda and the deferential peasant, between wealthy entrepreneurs and desperate street urchins. Politically, Latin America includes twenty-six nations, large and small, whose recent experience ranges from military dictatorship to electoral democracy to Fidel Castro’s socialist regime in Cuba. Economically, Latin America belongs to the “developing” world, beset by historical and contemporary obstacles to rapid economic growth, but here too there is diversity—from the one-crop dependency of tiny Honduras to the industrial promise of dynamic Brazil.

Throughout their modern history Latin Americans have sought, with greater or lesser zeal, to achieve political and economic independence from colonial, imperial, and neo-imperial powers. Thus it is bitter irony that the phrase *Latin America* was popularized by mid-nineteenth-century French, who thought that since their culture, like that of Spanish and Portuguese America, was “Latin” (i.e., Romance language-speaking), France was destined to assume leadership throughout the continent.

As these observations suggest, Latin America resists facile categorization. It is a region rich in paradox. This insight yields a number of instructive clues.

First, Latin America is both young and old. Beginning in 1492, its conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese created a totally new social order based on domination, hierarchy, and the intermingling of European, African, and indigenous elements. The European intrusion profoundly and ineradicably altered indigenous communities. Compared with the ancient



**Map 1** Contemporary Latin America

civilizations of Africa and Asia, these Latin American societies are relatively young. On the other hand, most nations of Latin America obtained political independence—from Spain and Portugal—in the early nineteenth century, more than 100 years before successful anticolonial movements in other developing areas. Thus by the standard of nationhood, Latin America is relatively old.

Second, Latin America has throughout its history been both tumultuous and stable. The Conquest began a tradition of political violence that has erupted in coups, assassinations, armed movements, military interventions, and (more rarely) social revolutions. Ideological encounters between liberalism, positivism, corporatism, anarchism, socialism, communism, fas-

cism, and religious teachings of every doctrinal hue have sharpened the intensity of struggle. Despite the differing forms of political conflict, old social and economic structures have persisted. Even where modern revolutions have struck, as in Mexico (1910) and Bolivia (1952), many aspects of traditional society survive. The Cuban Revolution (1959) seems at first an exception, yet even in Cuba the pull of history has continued to be strong, as we shall see.

Third, Latin America has been both independent and dependent, autonomous and subordinate. The achievement of nationhood by 1830 in all but parts of the Caribbean basin represented an assertion of sovereignty rooted in Enlightenment thought. Yet a new form of penetration by external powers—first Britain and France, then the United States—jeopardized this nationhood. Economic and political weakness vis-à-vis Europe and North America has frequently limited the choices available to Latin American policymakers. Within Latin America, power is ironically ambiguous: it is the supreme commodity, but it has only a limited effect.

Fourth, Latin America is both prosperous and poor. Ever since the Conquest, the region has been described as a fabulous treasure house of natural resources. First came the European lust for silver and gold. Today the urge may be for petroleum, gas, copper, iron ore, coffee, sugar, soybeans, or for expanded trade in general, but the image of endless wealth remains. In startling contrast, there is also the picture of poverty: peasants without tools, workers without jobs, children without food, mothers without hope. An aphorism oft repeated in Latin America summarizes this scene: "Latin America is a beggar atop a mountain of gold."

One can easily think of additional contrasts, but these should illustrate the difficulty—and fascination—in trying to come to grips with Latin America. To understand Latin American history and society requires a flexible, broad-gauge approach, and this is what we try to offer in this book. We draw on the work of many scholars, presenting our own interpretation, but also acquainting the reader with alternative views.

### *Interpretations of Latin America*

Most analysts of modern Latin America have stressed the area's political instability, marked frequently by dictatorship. North American and European observers have been especially fascinated with two questions: Why dictatorships? Why not democracy? This preoccupation is not recent. In 1930, for example, a U.S. economic geographer specializing in the region observed, "the years roll on and there arise the anxieties and disappointments of an ill-equipped people attempting to establish true republican forms of government." A year earlier an English scholar had noted that "the political history of the republics has been a record of alternating periods of liberty and despotism." Implicitly assuming or explicitly asserting that their style of democracy is superior to all other models of political organization, North American and European writers

frequently asked what was “wrong” with Latin America. Or with Latin Americans themselves.

What passed for answers was for many years a jumble of racist epithets, psychological simplifications, geographical platitudes, and cultural distortions. According to such views, Latin America could not achieve democracy because dark-skinned peoples (Indians and blacks) were unsuited for it; because passionate Latin tempers would not stand it; because tropical climates somehow prevented it; or because Roman Catholic doctrines inhibited it.

Each charge has its refutation: dictatorial rule has flourished in predominantly white countries, such as Argentina, as well as among mixed-blood societies, such as Mexico; it has appeared in temperate climes, such as Chile, not only in the tropics, such as Cuba; it has gained support from non-Catholics and nonpracticing Catholics, while many fervent worshippers have fought for liberty; and, as shown by authoritarian regimes outside Latin America, such as Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union, dictatorship is not restricted to any single temperament. Such explanations not only failed to explain. When carried to extremes, they helped justify rapidly increasing U.S. and European penetration—financial, cultural, military—of the “backward” republics to the south.

The scholarly scene improved in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when North American social scientists formulated “modernization theory.” As applied to Latin America, this theory held that economic growth would generate the social change that would in turn make possible more “developed” politics. The transition from a rural to an urban society would bring a change in values. People would begin to relate to and participate in the voluntary organizations that authentic democracy requires. Most important, a middle class would emerge—to play both a progressive and moderating role. Latin America and its citizenries were not so inherently “different” from Europe and North America. Instead they were simply “behind.” Modernization adepts thought the historical record showed this process was well under way in Latin America.

Thus analysts went to work describing Latin American history in the light of modernization theory. One optimistic and widely read U.S. scholar found in 1958 that the “middle sectors” had “become stabilizers and harmonizers and in the process have learned the dangers of dealing in absolute postulates.” The author of a late-1970s textbook on Latin American history saw “Latin American history since independence . . . as modernization growing slowly against the resistance of old institutions and attitudes.”

Reality, however, proved harsher. Instead of spreading general prosperity, economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s (and it reached sustained high rates in Mexico and Brazil) generally made income distribution more unequal. The gap in living standards between city and countryside grew. Domestic capital’s ability to compete with the huge transnational firms declined. Meanwhile, politics was hardly following the model predicted by

### Dimensions of Diversity

Although we commonly speak (and think) of “Latin America” as a single entity, it is essential to recognize the enormous variation that exists within the region. As this summary shows, there are major differences in population size (Brazil being five times larger than Argentina, for instance, and more than ten times the size of Chile); income per capita (Argentina far outdistancing Brazil, Peru, and the Dominican Republic); and demographic composition (Argentina and Chile being essentially European, Mexico and Peru being mostly *mestizo*, and Brazil and the Dominican Republic being mulatto).

One of our principal intellectual challenges is to understand the causes and the consequences of such variations. For further data and comparisons, see the Statistical Appendix.

	<i>Population (millions)</i>	<i>GNP/Capita (U.S. dollars)</i>	<i>Demographic Composition (principal elements only)</i>
Argentina	38	6940	European
Brazil	172	3070	European, African, mulatto
Chile	15	4590	European
Mexico	99	5530	European, indigenous, <i>mestizo</i>
Peru	26	1980	European, indigenous, <i>mestizo</i>
Dominican Republic	9	2230	European, African, mulatto

Note: *Mulattoes* are from European and African forebears, *mestizos* from European and indigenous.

Source for population and GNP data as of 2001: *World Bank Atlas* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2003), pp. 54–55.

many experts on modernization. The middle strata, relatively privileged, forged a sense of “class consciousness” which, in critical moments of decision, such as in Argentina in 1955 or 1976, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1973, led them to join the ruling classes in opposition to the popular masses. Politics took an authoritarian turn, producing military governments. And in stark contradiction of modernization theory, these patterns emerged in the most developed—and most rapidly developing—countries of the continent. What had gone wrong?

Two sets of answers came forth. One group of scholars focused on the cultural traditions of Latin America and their Spanish and Portuguese origins. These analysts argued, in effect, that antidemocratic politics was (and remains) a product of a Roman Catholic and Mediterranean worldview that stressed the need for harmony, order, and the elimination of conflict. By failing to grasp these continuities in the Iberian experience, scholars had confused form with substance, rhetoric with reality. Latin America’s constitutions were never as democratic as they appeared, party politics was



- [Song for a Scarlet Runner for free](#)
- [click \*\*Five Hundred Buildings of Paris\*\*](#)
- [read The 20/20 Diet: Turn Your Weight Loss Vision Into Reality pdf, azw \(kindle\)](#)
- [Sharon Tate: A Life pdf, azw \(kindle\), epub](#)
  
- <http://creativebeard.ru/freebooks/Prison-Break--True-Stories-of-the-World-s-Greatest-Escapes.pdf>
- <http://thewun.org/?library/Five-Hundred-Buildings-of-Paris.pdf>
- <http://reseauplatoparis.com/library/Local-Knowledge--Further-Essays-In-Interpretive-Anthropology.pdf>
- <http://kamallubana.com/?library/Sharon-Tate--A-Life.pdf>