



KEY CONCEPTS

NATIONALISM

ANTHONY D. SMITH

2ND EDITION, REVISED AND UPDATED

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NATIONALISM

Theory, Ideology, History

Second Edition

Anthony D. Smith

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Preface

This book aims to provide a short introduction to the concept of nationalism. Its purpose is to offer students and readers a critical synthesis of much of the existing scholarship in the field, focusing on the main theoretical contributions rather than the huge corpus of empirical studies. My chief objective is to examine the various theoretical, ideological and historical facets of the concept of nationalism and the central paradigms of explanation in the field. Inevitably, this has meant shifting the focus of attention in the later chapters from 'nationalism', understood as an ideology, movement and symbol, to language, to the object of its concerns, the 'nation', understood both as a contested concept and as a form of community and institutional behaviour. In practice, the two concepts are closely related, but I believe it is important not to conflate them, especially as it is possible to discern different forms of the category of the nation prior to the appearance of the *ideology* of nationalism, and outside the area of the latter's provenance.

In a short book of this kind, I make no claims to comprehensive treatment. Inevitably, certain areas have been neglected or omitted. For the debates on such topics as liberalism and nationalism, gender and nation, the reader is asked to consult the already large literatures in these subfields, as well as my general discussions in *Nationalism and Modernism*. Similarly, while the overall organization and tone of the book reflects my own views as an active participant in the debates on nations and nationalism, my primary concern with tracing the lines of these debates, especially in chapter 4, has meant that less space was available for developing my own views on the subject. Nevertheless, I have tried to sketch, in chapter 5, an alternative history of the nation. I hope also to have been able to convey something of the passion and complexity of the debates in the field over the last half century while providing a clear framework for grasping the different contributions to the study of nationalism.

I should like to express my thanks to John Thompson and Polity for asking me to contribute to the series on Key Concepts in the social sciences, and to Seeta Persaud for her help in preparing the typescript. For any errors and omissions, however, as well as for the views expressed, the responsibility is entirely mine.

Anthony D. Smith

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The countries of Syria and Nubia, the land of Egypt,
Thou settest every man in his place
Thou suppliest their necessities:
Everyone has his food, and his time of life is reckoned.
Their tongues are separate in speech,
And their natures as well;
Their skins are distinguished,
As thou distinguishest the foreign peoples.

...
All foreign distant countries, thou makest their life (also)
For thou hast set a Nile in heaven,

...
The Nile in heaven, it is for the foreign peoples ...

(From *The Hymn to the Ato*)

Introduction

This short book aims to introduce the concept of nationalism to readers and students for whom the field is unfamiliar. It focuses on nationalism primarily as an ideology, but also as a social movement and symbolic language, and explores its meanings, varieties and sources. Inevitably, this entails consideration of related concepts, such as the nation, national identity and the national state. As a result, the scope of this work is broad and necessarily interdisciplinary: in particular, it draws on the disciplines of history, sociology, political science, international relations and, to a certain extent, anthropology. The latter is included because some attention needs to be given to the cognate field of ethnicity; for, as I hope to show, ethnic identities and communities constitute a large part of the historical and social background of nations and nationalism.

The significance of this topic should not be in doubt to anyone even mildly familiar with events since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Few of the many international political crises of the last decade or so have not involved a strong component of ethnic sentiment and nationalist aspirations, while some of them – notably those in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East – have been triggered, and even defined, by such sentiments and aspirations. These have proved to be the most bitter and intractable conflicts, the most costly in terms of lives and resources, the most resistant to the efforts of governments and others to accommodate the interests of the respective parties, and the most impervious to the blandishments and threats of friend and foe.

But, beyond the headlines, with their descriptions of the conflict and violence of ‘hot’ nationalism, we encounter a more stable and taken-for-granted structure of ‘inter-national’ relations, which shapes and channel the processes and events of the modern world. This is something which is often referred to as ‘a world of nations’. By such a phrase is meant not some essentialist reification of nations or nation-states, but, rather, a political map and institutional and emotional framework in and through which personalities, events and wider processes of change leave their mark and contribute to the transformations that have forged, and continue to shape, the contemporary world. Michael Billington (1995) refers to this map and framework in terms of an everyday, ‘banal’ nationalism, one that is habitually ‘enhabited’ in society – ingrained into the very texture of our lives and politics, even present, if barely visible, like ‘unwaved flags’.

But the significance of nationalism is not confined to the world of politics. It is also cultural and intellectual, for ‘the world of nations’ structures our global outlooks and symbolic systems. I am not claiming for nationalism any significant degree of intellectual coherence, let alone the tradition of philosophical engagement characteristic of other modern political traditions such as liberalism and socialism. Nevertheless, even if it lacked great thinkers, nationalism – or perhaps we should say, the concept of the nation – has attracted considerable numbers of influential intellectuals – writers, artists, composers, historians, philologists, educators – who have devoted their energies to discovering and representing the identities and images of their respective nations, from Herder, Burke and Rousseau to Dostoevskii, Sibelius, Diego Rivera and Iqbal.

The cultural and psychological importance of the nation, and hence of nationalism, is even more profound. The ubiquity of nationalism, the hold it exerts over millions of people in every continent today, attests to its ability to inspire and resonate among ‘the people’ in ways that only religions have previously been able to encompass. This suggests the need to pay close attention to the role of symbolic elements in the language and ideology of nationalism, and to the moral, ritual and emotional

aspects of the discourse and action of the nation. It is not enough to link a particular national(ist) discourse to specific political actors or social groups, let alone read off the former from the social position and characteristics of the latter. Nationalism has its own rules, rhythms and memories, which shape the interests of its bearers even more than they shape its contours, endowing them with a recognizably 'nationalist' political shape and directing them to familiar national goals.

It is these rules, rhythms and memories of nationalism with which I shall be particularly concerned here, for they provide a bridge from the outer world of power politics and social interests to the inner world of the nation and its characteristic concepts, symbols and emotions. This concern in turn shapes the way in which I have structured the argument of this book. That argument revolves around the major, underlying 'paradigms' of understanding in the field, and the political, historiographical and sociological debates which they have fuelled. These debates are diffuse and wide-ranging. They concern not only competing ideologies of nationalism, nor even just the clash of particular theories. They involve radical disagreements over definitions of key terms, widely divergent histories of the nation and rival accounts of the 'shape of things to come'.

Each of these debates and differences requires separate consideration. I start, therefore, with terminology and concepts, outlining the main differences in approach to the definition of key concepts such as 'ethnie', 'nation', 'nationalism' and 'national state', and offering my own route through the minefield. Next I consider the ideology, or ideologies, of nationalism, notably the debate between 'organic' and 'voluntarist' approaches, as well as the vexed question of a 'core doctrine' of nationalism.

Chapter 3 turns to questions of explanation, and discusses the basic divide between 'modernist' and other approaches. It then outlines the key features of the four main paradigms of explanation – modernism, primordialism, perennialism and ethno-symbolism – revealing their theoretical interrelations. Chapter 4 continues this discussion by showing how the key theoretical debates in the field over the role of ideology, rational choice, the modern state and social construction in the genesis of nations and nationalism derive from these four paradigms and reveal their respective strengths and limitations.

The fifth chapter relates different 'histories of the nation' – modern, medieval and ancient – to particular theories and their master-paradigms, and then argues for an 'ethno-symbolic' reading which links modern nations to premodern *ethnies* through myth, symbol, memory, value and tradition. The final chapter considers the prospects for nations and nationalism in a 'postmodern' epoch of ethnic revival, globalization and increasingly hybridized identity – as well as the utility of 'postmodernist' and constructionist understandings and cultural ethno-symbolic interpretations of the future of nations and nationalism.

My aim throughout is twofold: in the first place, to outline the key debates in the field as clearly as possible, and, second, to offer my own ethno-symbolic account. This is clearly no easy task. Though I outline (and defend) such an approach at various points, I am conscious of the need to give as much coverage as possible within the constraints of space to alternative theories and readings, to provide readers with the necessary information and argument to allow them to make up their own minds. Similarly, while aiming for clarity throughout, I am concerned to reveal the full extent of scholarly divisions and disagreements about the phenomena of nations and nationalism. There are no easy solutions in this much-disputed field of study, and it would be idle to pretend that we are on the verge of some general consensus. At the same time, we possess today much more information about specific cases and the role of various factors on which to base our discussions and disagreements; and that

itself allows a clearer view of the field and its problems, and hence of the tasks ahead. It is in the spirit that I offer this brief introduction for those new to the field.

Concepts

If there is one point on which there is agreement, it is that the term 'nationalism' is quite modern. Its earliest recorded use in anything like a recognizably social and political sense goes back to the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder and the French counter-revolutionary cleric, the Abbé Augustin de Barruel at the end of the eighteenth century. It was rarely used in the early nineteenth century; in English, its first use, in 1836, appears to be theological, the doctrine that certain nations are divinely elected. Thereafter, it tended to be equated with national egotism, but usually other terms such as 'nationality' and 'nationalness', with the meanings of national fervour or national individuality, were preferred.¹

The Meanings of 'Nationalism'

It was really only during the last century that the term nationalism acquired the range of meanings that we associate with it today. Of these usages, the most important are:

- (1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations;
- (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation;
- (3) a language and symbolism of the nation;
- (4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation;
- (5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular.

The first of these usages, the *process of formation* of nations, is very general and itself embraces a series of more specific processes which often form the object of nationalism in other, narrower senses of the term. It is therefore best left for later consideration when we look at the term 'nation'.

Of the other four usages, the second, *national consciousness or sentiment*, needs to be carefully distinguished from the other three. They are, of course, closely related, but they do not necessarily go together. One can, for example, possess considerable national feeling in the absence of any language and symbolism, movement or even ideology on behalf of the nation. This was the predicament in which Niccolò Machiavelli found himself when his calls to Italians in the early sixteenth century to unite against the northern barbarians fell on deaf ears. On the other hand, a group could exhibit a high degree of national consciousness, but lack any overt ideology, let alone a political movement, on behalf of the nation, though it is likely to possess at least some national symbols and myths. The contrast between an organized ideological movement of nationalism, on the one hand, and a more diffuse feeling of national belonging, on the other, is sufficiently clear to allow us to treat the concept of national consciousness or sentiment separately from that of nationalism, even if in practice there is often some degree of overlap between them.²

The term *nationalism*, therefore, will be understood here as referring to one or more of the last three usages: a language and symbolism, a sociopolitical movement and an ideology of the nation. Though each of these nevertheless presupposes some measure of national feeling, certainly among the

nationalists themselves, if not the designated population at large, needs to be borne in mind; for serves to connect the more active and organized sectors to the usually much larger, more passive and fragmented segments of the population.

As a *sociopolitical movement*, nationalism does not differ, in principle, from others in terms of its organizations, activities and techniques, except in one particular: its emphasis upon cultural gestation and representation. The ideologies of nationalism require an immersion in the culture of the nation – the rediscovery of its history, the revival of its vernacular language through such disciplines as philology and lexicography, the cultivation of its literature, especially drama and poetry, and the restoration of its vernacular arts and crafts, as well as its music, including native dance and folk songs. This accounts for the frequent cultural and literary renaissances associated with nationalist movements, and the rich variety of the cultural activities which nationalism can excite. Typically, a nationalist movement will commence not with a protest rally, declaration or armed resistance, but with the appearance of literary societies, historical research, music festivals and cultural journals – the kind of activity that Miroslav Hroch analysed as an essential first phase of the rise and spread of Eastern European nationalisms, and, we may add, of many subsequent nationalisms of colonial Africa and Asia. As a result, ‘humanistic’ intellectuals – historians and philologists, artists and composers, poets, novelists and film directors – tend to be disproportionately represented in nationalist movements and revivals (Argyle 1969; Hroch 1985).³

The *language and symbolism* of nationalism merit more attention, and their motifs will recur throughout these pages. But, despite considerable overlap with symbolism, the language or discourse of nationalism cannot be considered separately, since they are so closely tied to the ideologies of nationalism. Indeed, the key concepts of nationalism’s distinctive language form intrinsic components of its core doctrine and its characteristic ideologies. I shall therefore consider this conceptual language under the heading of ideology in chapter 2.⁴

The *symbolism* of nationalism, on the other hand, shows such a degree of regularity across the globe that we may profitably extract it from its ideological framework. A national symbolism is, of course, distinguished by its all-encompassing object, the nation, but equally by the tangibility and vividness of its characteristic signs. These start with a collective proper name. For nationalists, as for the feuding families of Verona, a rose by any other name could never smell as sweet – as the recent dispute over the name of Macedonia sharply reminded us. Proper names are chosen, or retained from the past, to express the nation’s distinctiveness, heroism and sense of destiny, and to resonate these qualities among the members. Similarly with national flags and anthems. Their colours, shapes and patterns – like those of the old Danish cross or the Revolutionary French tricolor – and their verses and music – as in the British ‘God Save the King’ or the French Marseillaise – epitomize the specific qualities of the nation and by their simple forms and rhythms aim to conjure a vivid sense of unique history and/or destiny among the designated population (Billig 1995; Elgenius 2005). It matters little that to outsiders the differences between many flags appear minimal, and that the verses of anthems reveal a limited range of themes. What counts is the potency of the meanings conveyed by such signs to the members of the nation. The fact that every nation sports a capital city, a national assembly, national coinage, passports and frontiers, similar remembrance ceremonies for the fallen in battle, the requisite military parades and national oaths, as well as their own national academies of music, art and science, national museums and libraries, national monuments and war memorials, festivals and holidays, etc., and that lack of such symbols marks a grave national deficit, suggests that the symbolism of the nation has assumed a life of its own, one that is based on global comparisons and

drive for national salience and parity in a visual and semantic ‘world of nations’. The panoply of national symbols only serves to express, represent and reinforce the boundary definition of the nation and to unite the members inside through a common imagery of shared memories, myths and values.⁵

Of course, national symbolism, like nationalist movements, cannot be divorced from the *ideology of nationalism*, the final and main usage of the term. The ideology of nationalism serves to give form and direction to both symbols and movements. The goals of the sociopolitical movement are defined not by the activities or the personnel of the movement, but by the basic ideals and tenets of the ideology. Similarly, the characteristic symbols and language of nationalism are shaped by the role they play in explicating and evoking the ideals of the nation and furthering the goals laid down by nationalist ideology. So, it is the ideology that must supply us with an initial working definition of the term ‘nationalism’, for its contents are defined by the ideologies which place the nation at the centre of their concerns and purposes, and which separate it from other, adjacent ideologies (see Motyl 1999, ch. 5).

Definitions

Nationalism

The ideology of nationalism has been defined in many ways, but most of the definitions overlap and reveal common themes. The main theme, of course, is an overriding concern with the nation. Nationalism is an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its well-being. But this is rather vague. We need to go further and isolate the main goals under whose headings nationalism seeks to promote the nation’s well-being. These generic goals are three: national autonomy, national unity and national identity, and, for nationalists, a nation cannot survive without a sufficient degree of all three. This suggests the following working definition of nationalism: ‘A ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.’

This is a working definition based on the common elements of the ideals of self-styled nationalists and it is therefore inductive in character. But it inevitably simplifies and extracts from the many variations in the ideals of nationalists, and assumes thereby something of a general, ideal-typical character. This definition ties the ideology to a goal-oriented movement, since as an ideology nationalism prescribes certain kinds of action. Nevertheless, it is the core concepts of the ideology that define the goals of the movement and thereby differentiate it from other kinds of movement.

However, the close link between ideology and movement in no way limits the concept of nationalism only to movements seeking independence. The words ‘and maintaining’ in the definition recognize the continuing influence of nationalism in long-established, or in recently, independent nations. This is important when it comes to analysing, as John Breuilly has done, the ‘renewed nationalisms’ of national states and their governments (Breuilly 1993).

The definition I am proposing presupposes a concept of the ‘nation’, but it does not suggest that nations exist prior to ‘their’ nationalisms. The words ‘or potential “nation” ’ recognize the many situations in which a small minority of nationalists who possess a general concept of the abstract ‘nation’ seek to create particular nations ‘on the ground’. We often find nationalisms without nations – their nations – especially in the postcolonial states of Africa and Asia, like Nigeria, Tanzania and Indonesia. Such nationalisms are not limited to the attaining of independence, or more generally,

political goals. They cover, as we shall see, important areas of culture and society; the ideal of national identity, in particular, relates to cultural issues that other ideologies neglect – and even nationalism pursues the goal of national identity in varying degrees. But, always, they come back to the ideal of the nation.⁶

Ethnie and nation

How then shall we define the concept of the ‘nation’? This is undoubtedly the most problematic and contentious term in the field. There are some who would dispense with it altogether. Charles Tilly described it as ‘one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon’ (1975: 6), and preferred to concentrate on the state – a concept not without its problems, either. More recently Rogers Brubaker has warned us of the dangers of reifying the concept of the nation, by seeing nations as ‘substantial, enduring collectivities’. We should, he argues, rather ‘think about nationalism without nations’, and see ‘nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalised cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening’ (1996: 21). Here Brubaker cites the example of the national republics of the Soviet Union as creations of nationalist design by political elites. Calhoun, too, operates with a concept of nationalism as a discursive formation, though for him the resulting nations are important in their own right (Calhoun 1997 and 2006).

There are two kinds of answer to such misgivings. The first operates within the circle of nationalist ideology. On this reading, nationalism highlights the popular sentiments evoked by the idea of the nation; in this ideological discourse, the nation is a felt and lived community, a category of behaviour as much as imagination, and it is one that requires of the members certain kinds of action. Typically nationalist activities include the study of ethnic history and philology, archaeological excavations of historic national sites, the erection of buildings and structures, and the holding of national games and sports. And, in all societies, nationalism has encouraged the proliferation of commemorative rites and ceremonies, especially for those who fell in battle on behalf of their nation, as well as those who brought great victories. Hence, its ‘substance’ and ‘endurance’, as in other kinds of community, reside in its repeated consequences, and the analyst has to take account of this felt reality through a separate concept of the nation, without seeking to reify it.⁷

The second answer touches on a wider problem. If the concept of the nation predated the ideology of nationalism, then we can no longer characterize it simply as a category of *nationalist* practice. In fact, further, we can envisage even a few premodern nations before the advent of nationalist ideologies in the late eighteenth century, then we shall need a definition of the concept of the nation which is independent of the ideology of nationalism, but is nevertheless consonant with it. Here lies the greatest problem, and the most insuperable divide, in the study of nationalism.⁸

Definitions of the concept of the nation range from those that stress ‘objective’ factors, such as language, religion and customs, territory and institutions, to those that emphasize purely ‘subjective’ factors, such as attitudes, perceptions and sentiments. An example that stresses ‘objective’ factors comes from Joseph Stalin: ‘A nation is an historically constituted, stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture’ (1973: 61). An example of a more ‘subjective’ definition of the nation comes from Benedict Anderson: ‘it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991: 6).

These definitions undoubtedly isolate important features of the concept of the nation, yet objections can be made to both. Insofar as the ‘objective’ definitions are stipulative, they nearly always exclude

some widely accepted cases of nations, sometimes quite intentionally. As Max Weber (1948) showed purely 'objective' criteria of the nation – language, religion, territory and so on – always fail to include some nations. Conversely, 'subjective' definitions generally take in too large a catch of cases. Emphasizing sentiment, will, imagination and perception as criteria of the nation and nation belonging makes it difficult to separate out nations from other kinds of collectivity such as regions, tribes, city-states and empires, which attract similar subjective attachments.⁹

The solution generally adopted has been to choose criteria which span the 'objective–subjective' spectrum. This strategy has yielded many interesting and useful definitions, but no scholarly consensus. Most students of the subject have, nevertheless, agreed on two points: a nation is not a state and it is not an ethnic community.

It is not a state, because the concept of the state relates to institutional activity, while that of the nation denotes a type of community. The concept of the state can be defined as a set of autonomous institutions, differentiated from other institutions, possessing a legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory. This is very different from the concept of the nation. Nations, as we said, are felt and lived communities whose members share a homeland and a culture. Examples of states would include the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom, where Russians, Serbs and Croats, and Scots and English, would constitute nations; attempts to forge a British nation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not prove successful in the long run because of the loss of empire in which the Scots, in particular, played a considerable role in its administration (see Colley 1992).

It is not an ethnic community because, despite some overlap in that both belong to the same family of phenomena (collective cultural identities), the ethnic community usually has no political referent and in many cases lacks a public culture and even a territorial dimension, since it is not necessary for an ethnic community to be in physical possession of its historic territory. A nation, on the other hand, must reside in a perceived homeland of its own, at least for a long period of time, in order to constitute itself as a nation; and to aspire to nationhood and be recognized as a nation, it also needs to evolve a public culture and desire some degree of self-determination. On the other hand, it is not necessary, as we saw, for a nation to possess a sovereign state of its own, but only to have an aspiration for a measure of autonomy coupled with physical residence in its perceived homeland.¹⁰

If in practice the line between nations and ethnic communities (or *ethnies*, to use the French term) is not clearcut, we still need to retain the conceptual distinction between them, as David Miller correctly urges. Yet his own definition of the nation (or 'nationality', as he prefers to call it) as 'a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture' (1995: 27), besides tending to the subjective end of the spectrum (it might, after all, apply to city-states and even tribal confederacies), brings the concept of the nation very close to that of the ethnic community. *Ethnies* are also constituted by shared beliefs and commitment, have shared memories and continuity, engage in joint actions, and are usually connected to a particular territory, even if they do not reside in it. The only major difference is that ethnic communities generally lack public cultures. Nevertheless, Miller's definition highlights some of the main attributes of nations: the fact that they are communities, that they have shared beliefs or myths, that they have histories and that they are linked to particular territories. Can we extend this definition so as to highlight both the overlaps and the differences between nations and *ethnies*?

I propose to define the concept of nation as 'a named human community residing in a perceived

homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all members'. The concept of *ethnie* can in turn be defined as 'a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites'.¹¹

While we may employ them as working definitions, these are really summaries of pure or ideal types of 'nation' and '*ethnie*', derived from a stylization of the respective beliefs and sentiments of elite members of *ethnies* and of nations. They do not list common denominators. For this reason, they tend to highlight their distinctive elements and the key differences between them. These can be more easily grasped by setting out the attributes of both kinds of collective cultural identity, as shown in table 1.1. That ethnic communities and nations belong to the same category of phenomena is made plain by the upper half of the table: nations, like *ethnies*, share the attributes of collective name, common myths and shared memories. On the other hand, the lower half shows that nations are differentiated by their members sharing common laws and customs and a distinct public culture. Moreover, in the ideal type, nations *occupy* the homeland, whereas ethnic communities may be only linked – symbolically – to theirs. Similarly, *ethnies* need not have a public culture, only some common cultural element – it could be language, religion, customs or shared institutions – whereas a distinct public culture is a key attribute of nations. In this connection, even the first attribute undergoes a change – from the various memory traditions found in *ethnies* to a codified, standardized *national history*.¹²

Table 1.1 Attributes of *ethnies* and nations

Ethnie	Nation
Proper name	Proper name
Common myths of ancestry, etc.	Common myths
Shared memories	Shared history
Cultural differentia(e)	Distinct public culture
Link with homeland	Residence in perceived homeland
Some (elite) solidarity	Common laws and customs

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to read into this distinction any overall evolutionary sequence. After all, in the contemporary world we find many *ethnies* alongside, or within, nations, and it is at least a moot point whether some nations can be found among the many *ethnies* of premodern epochs. What can be said now, and I shall elaborate on this later, is that the ideal type of the *ethnie*, with its looser organization, is the more generic concept and the nation is the more specific; but that, becoming more 'specialized', the nation, even in those cases where it originated from a pre-existing *ethnie*, also becomes more inclusive, more complex and less tied to its original ethnic base. The key to this paradox, as we shall see, lies in the transformation of the relationships between ethnicity and culture, and between culture and politics.

All this is rather abstract and theoretical. When we move from ideal-types to empirical instances we find approximations and exceptions. A good example is the 'diaspora nation'. Strictly speaking there can be no such phenomenon: a nation, as we saw, occupies its homeland, but *ethnies* may wander the earth. But, what about communities that can claim to have been nations, but which, like the Armenians and Jews, for centuries did not occupy their homelands, having lost their independence states? Can we reasonably say that they ceased to be nations, when they so clearly continued to preserve their public religious cultures and common laws and customs? It is a question that admits no easy answer, and it suggests that we must use our ideal-types and the distinction between *ethnie* and nation with care.¹³

Then there are the cases of ‘polyethnic nations’ which comprise separate *ethnies* that have for one reason or another come together, or been forced together, and have forged a common history and shared political memories. In Belgium, Switzerland and Spain, separate *ethnies* continue to coexist within a (federal) state and their members claim both a separate ethnic and a common national identity. In the Swiss case, for example, some of the Jurassiens aspired to cantonal independence from Berne, but their aspirations were clearly bounded by a Swiss ‘national identity’ and political horizon. Despite problems of multiculturalism, the Swiss can in general claim a definite public culture, a bounded homeland, and common laws and customs for all citizens, while even the French and Italian speaking cantons have accepted some of the *Innenschweiz* founding myths and historical memories of the old Confederation (*Eidgenossenschaft*). More complex issues are presented in Spain and Belgium by those *ethnies* – Basques, Catalans and Flemish – that either constitute nations by the above criteria or aspire to nationhood. Can we conceive of ‘nations within nations’, a Flemish or a Catalan nation within a Belgian or a Spanish nation? Or is it legitimate and useful to speak of nations only within ‘national states’? (see Petersen 1975; Steinberg 1976).

National state

This last is the position of those who stipulate a strictly ethnicist definition of the concept of the nation. A good example is the seminal work of Walker Connor, for whom the concepts of nation and nationalism must be sharply distinguished from those of state and patriotism. So, he would speak of Belgian or Spanish ‘patriotism’ – that is, loyalty to the larger territorial state and its institutions – and contrast it with a Flemish or Catalan ‘ethno-nationalism’; the latter he defines as a psychological bond of ancestral relatedness, stemming ultimately from kinship sentiments – even if the myth of origin fails (as it so often does) to correspond to real, biological descent. By a similar logic, Connor sees British state patriotism coexisting with English, Scots and Welsh ethnonationalisms (1994: 102, 202).

I am not sure that such a sharp distinction, however useful analytically, can be maintained. To take this last example: in practice, the English have always found it impossible to distinguish their own English ethno-nationalism from a British patriotism, which they conceive of equally as their ‘own’. This is not simply an imperialist reflex. Rather, it reflects the way in which British patriotism was formed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be a ‘natural’ extension of English ethnic nationalism, and how a British nation came to be viewed by the English, and not a few Scots (‘North Britons’), as the coming together of the various nations inhabiting a united kingdom – despite considerable continuing resistance to English dominance. If we recall the frequency of nationalisms without nations, does this invalidate the idea, and the historicity, of a British nationalism (as opposed to a British patriotism, in Connor’s sense), if ultimately an integrated British nation failed to materialize? (Kearney 1990: ch. 7–8; Colley 1992: ch. 1).¹⁴

Similar conceptual problems beset the French case, where the process of integration, or at least acculturation, seems to have gone further. Bretons, Basques, Alsatians and even Corsicans may not aspire to independent statehood (except for a minority), though their movements have at times revealed a desire for some self-determination, at least in the cultural and economic fields. But what does this leave the French? Can a dominant French ethno-nationalism be distinguished from an equally hegemonic French state patriotism? How can we in practice separate the French nation from France, the national state, when so many of the key symbols of French nationalism are political? (see Gildea 1994).

No doubt, the French example, which has been so influential in other contexts, has inspired the

tendency to conflate state and nation and has helped to popularize the notion of the 'nation-state'. There are two problems with this compound term. The first concerns the relationship between the two components. Too often, theorists see the state as dominant, with the nation as a kind of junior partner or qualifying adjective. Little attention is then given to the dynamics of the nation. As for nationalism, it becomes a psychological epiphenomenon, a concomitant of state sovereignty. The second problem is empirical: in practice, as Walker Connor pointed out some time ago, the monolithic 'nation-state' where state and nation are exactly coextensive, where there is just one nation in a given state and one state for a given nation – is rare; nearly 90 per cent of the world's states are polyethnic, and about half of these are seriously divided by ethnic cleavages (Connor 1972; Giddens 1985: 216–20).

In the circumstances, it might be better to opt for a more neutral descriptive term, such as 'nation-state', defined as 'a state legitimated by the principles of nationalism, whose members possess a certain measure of national unity and integration (but not of cultural homogeneity)'. By making national unity and integration a variable, such a definition avoids the problem of 'national incongruence': the fact that the boundaries of nations and the borders of states in so many parts of the world fail to correspond. In similar vein, we might speak of 'state-nations', where polyethnic states aspire to nationhood and seek to turn themselves into unified (but not homogeneous) nations through measures of accommodation and integration. This is the situation of several states in Africa and Asia, created out of colonial territories and retaining colonial boundaries and institutions (and often their *lingua franca* for administrative purposes).¹⁵

National identity

The last term in the field of national phenomena that I want to consider is that of 'national identity'. Its popularity is relatively recent, and it has replaced earlier terms such as 'national character' and, later, 'national consciousness', which were widely used in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Why this should be the case is unclear. Perhaps the present widespread concern with identity is part of a broader trend of contemporary individualism; it may, equally, reflect the anxiety and alienation of many people in an increasingly fragmented world (see Kemilainen 1967; Bhabha 1990: ch. 16).

Critique of national identity

Like other terms in the field, that of 'national identity' has resisted easy definition, let alone consensus. It denotes at once a central ideal of nationalist ideology and an analytical term, and as such has attracted the ire of critics, such as Sinisa Malesevic and Rogers Brubaker. I shall return to the nationalist ideal in the next chapter. Here I want to examine the recent debate over the analytical concept.

The main issues have been clearly and forcefully stated by Sinisa Malesevic in his recent book *Identity as Ideology*. In it, he argues, first, that the general concept of identity has been inflated and covers too many things to be of any analytical use; second, that by transposing a precise concept from mathematics and logic signifying similarity-cum-difference to the social sciences, the concept becomes vague and nebulous, or alternatively, too rigid and reified; and third, that we should consequently return to older, more tried and tested concepts, above all, that of ideology. Malesevic here distinguishes two kinds of illegitimate usages and unhelpful concepts: first, those who claim that 'identity' rather than 'interest' provides a separate ground of action, which is unprovable; second,

those who view identity as a foundational form of selfhood or deep group membership, who are guilty of essentialism and reification, insofar as they tend to treat ethnic groups and national identities as objects with 'essential' traits (Malesevic 2006, chs.1–4; Brubaker 2005).

There are several counter-arguments to this critique. We may readily agree that identity concepts have been used excessively; we speak today, not only of professional or artistic identity, 'identity crisis', and, more dubiously, of 'identity politics', but also of 'identity fraud', 'identification parade' and even the Identity and Passport Office! But popular over-use does not disqualify a concept from legitimate analytical use, properly defined and circumscribed. Nor does its relatively recent vintage in the scholarly literature; the concept of self or identity reaches far back into history, being found in the king Oedipus' relentless, but ultimately catastrophic, quest for his own identity, and the prophet Jonah's affirmation of his 'Hebrew' identity on the tempest-racked ship to Tarshish – not to mention Polonius' familiar advice to Laertes 'to thine own self be true'.

More important, social science concepts like 'ethnic identity' and 'national identity', unlike concepts in the natural sciences, figure simultaneously as analytical concepts and participants' notions and categories of practice. This is equally the case with concepts like class, caste, the state and ideology, the concept favoured by Sinisa Malesevic. Unlike natural science concepts, they cannot be sealed off from everyday beliefs and practices, and social scientists and historians cannot, and should not, permit themselves to retreat into a rarefied tower of pure and abstract analysis. They must stay close to the empirical realities they wish to address, and that means using concepts like the state, and ideologies of communism and fascism, that can be, and have been, naturalized and reified, and that possess a long history of being used to exclude and oppress others. This in turn means that we cannot dispense with concepts of 'identity' and 'national identity' as objects of analysis, even while limiting their range and exercising care over their use (see Edensor 2002).

We also need to recognize the centrality of a 'sense of national identity' for many people, and the centrality of the ideals of individuality and authenticity which it expresses. Hence, the importance of a sense of national identity as one of the main goals of nationalist movements, along with national autonomy and unity, given that so many people seek to create, or preserve, or even to die for, a sense of national identity, as Benedict Anderson (1991) reminds us. Not all people, not all the time, nor all equally, or indeed for the self same narrative of a sense of national identity; but, all the same, with sufficient numbers and with enough intensity to make its use indispensable. At the same time, we should note that a 'sense of national identity', however significant, is nevertheless a concomitant of the concept of the nation, or 'national community': it sums up the members' perceptions of difference and distinctiveness vis-à-vis other national communities and their members. Hence the rationale for my own working definition of the concept of national identity as 'the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation by the members of a national community of the pattern of symbols, values, myths, memories and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the variable identification of individual members of that community with that heritage and its cultural elements' (see A. D. Smith 2009a, ch.6).

Crucial to this definition are two relationships: the first, between collective and individual levels of analysis, and the second, between continuity and change of identity. Too often, one of these components is emphasized at the expense of the other; we need to maintain the balance between them if we are to make sense of the notion of national identity.

Levels of identity

We hear today a great deal about the 'situational' character of ethnic and national identities, and the prevalence in the modern world of 'multiple identities'. According to this fashionable view, we identify with a variety of collective affiliations – families, gender categories, regions, occupational groups, parties, confessions and *ethnies* – and can move from one to the other, often quite easily, as circumstances require. We can, at one and the same time, be wives or husbands, Christians or Muslims, professionals or manual workers, as well as members of particular regions and ethnic communities, invoking our membership of these collectivities for certain purposes. So, each of us has multiple identities, from the most intimate family circle to the widest circle of humanity; and, further, in a free society many of these identities become increasingly symbolic and optional (see Gans 1977; Okamura 1981; Hall 1992; Eriksen 1993).

But this is to look at collective identities only from the standpoint of the individual member. It is also possible to consider such identities as cultural collectivities, and, in some cases, communities defined by shared memories and myths, and common values and symbols. These two levels of analysis, the individual and the collective, are often confused and need to be kept distinct. While cultural collectivities and communities are composed of individual members, we cannot reduce them to a simple aggregate of individuals who share certain traits or who live together. There is so much more to these collective identities in terms of their shared values and norms, memories and symbols. Conversely, the actions and dispositions of individual members cannot be predicted from an analysis of the features of a particular community or collective identity; the latter can only tell us something about the contexts of members' dispositions and the constraints on those members. That is why it is so important to keep these two levels of analysis of collective identity separate (see Scheuch 1966).

The case is strongest where the collective identity is based primarily on cultural elements, as in the case of castes, ethnic communities, religious denominations and nations. Whereas other types of collective identity, such as classes and regions, function as interest groups and therefore dissolve more easily when they have attained their object, cultural collectivities are much more stable because their basic cultural elements from which they are constructed – memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions – tend to be more persistent and binding; they represent recurrent elements of collective continuity and difference. These elements are embodied in collective memories of great exploits and personages, values of honour, justice and the like, symbols of sacred objects, food, dress and emblems, myths of origins, liberation and chosenness, and traditions and customs, rituals and genealogies. In these cases, the collective cultural element is particularly salient and durable, and needs to be analysed separately from issues of individual identification.¹⁶

Hence the two parts of my proposed working definition: the first part defines the mechanisms of cultural continuity and change on the collective level, while the second focuses on the individual member's relationship to the collectivity.

Continuity and change

The above analysis may give the impression that collective cultural identities are somehow fixed and static. That is very far from being the case. True, we are dealing here with long-term constructs, but these are not essences or fixed quantities of traits. Cultural identities and communities are as much subject to processes of change and dissolution as everything else, and these changes may be gradual and cumulative, or sudden and discontinuous. The only difference from other kinds of collective identity is the generally slower rate and the longer time-span of the rhythms of cultural change, which as a result require methods of analysis over the *longue durée*.¹⁷

That is why the proposed definition refers to processes of 'reinterpretation' of the pattern of memories, values, symbols, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations. Today, we are particularly aware of how the components of national identities change, but this is a process that occurs in every generation, as external events and internal realignments of groups and power encourage new understandings of collective traditions. This process of 'ethno-symbolic reconstruction' involves the reselection, recombination and recodification of previously existing values, symbols, memories and the like, as well as the addition of new cultural elements by each generation. Thus, the 'heroic' vision of national identity, with its themes of struggle, liberation and sacrifice typical of newly independent nations or 'state-nations', may, in the next generation, cede place to a more open, pragmatic and utilitarian version of the nation's identity, stressing such themes as entrepreneurial ability, organizational skills and tolerance of diversity, themes that can be traced back to alternative ethnic traditions in the nation's history.

Hence, change is built into the definition of national identity, yet it is change that operates within clear parameters set by the culture and traditions of the nation in question and its distinctive heritage. It could not be otherwise. Insofar as identity connotes a measure of stability, of sameness over time, change can only operate within clear boundaries. Even if change is sudden and disruptive, short of total destruction of the nation, it will produce new elements that can be culturally assimilated by the membership; even revolutions tend to return to what the functionalists termed a society's 'central values'. It is the same with the transformation of nations, and it allows us to assume that the 'daily plebiscite' that constitutes the nation does in fact preserve it sufficiently for us to speak of the same nation from one generation to the next.

Further reading

The following texts have particularly useful discussions of the problems of defining key terms like 'nation' and 'nationalism': *Ethno-Nationalism*, Connor (1994) and his incisive essay 'The dawning of nations' in *When is the Nation?*, Ichijo and Uzelac (2005); *On Nationality*, Miller (1995); and 'What is a nation?', A. D. Smith (2002) with its revised set of definitions of key terms. On the concept of 'national identity', see the recent debate between Malesevic (*Identity as Ideology*, 2006) and A. D. Smith (*Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, 2009). The role of ethnicity in the modern world is explored by Eriksen (*Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 1993) and by the essays in Kaufmann (*Re-Thinking Ethnicity*, 2004b).

Notes

- [1](#) For fuller discussions of these key terms, see Zernatto (1944), Snyder (1954) and Kemilainen (1964).
- [2](#) Definitions of nationalism that equate it with national sentiment can be found in Michelat and Thomas (1966), Kohn (1967a: ch. 1) and Seton-Watson (1977: ch. 1).
- [3](#) For the strategies and tactics of nationalist movements, see Breuilly (1993) and Esman (1994). The nationalist goals and tactics of stateless nations in the West are analysed by Guibernau (1999).
- [4](#) For an analysis of nationalism as mainly a discursive formation, see Calhoun (1997); see also Brubaker (1996).
- [5](#) While there is no general study of national symbolism, the essays in Hobsbawm and Ranger (1988) and the work of Mosse (1975 and 1990), are of great value. See also Hedetoft (1995: Part I, ch. 4),

and the essays in the great opus on French 'sites of memory', edited by Nora (1997–8, esp. Vol. III). On flags, see Elgenius (2005).

[6](#) Most 'anti-colonial' nationalisms were ideological movements of minorities among ethnically heterogeneous populations thrown together by colonial administrations, as in Nigeria or India. Yet, though they possessed no national basis, on the European model, these elites aimed to create one. Theirs were 'nations of intent' (Rotberg 1967). See also Chatterjee (1986).

[7](#) Here, the distinction made by Walker Connor (1994: 202) between historical and *felt* reality, is useful; what counts is not what is, but what is felt to be, the case.

[8](#) For the idea of the nation and national character predating the ideology of nationalism by at least a century, see the richly detailed studies of Kemilainen (1964) and Greenfeld (1992: chs 1–2).

[9](#) For valuable discussions of the problems of defining the concept of the nation, see Deutsch (1966: ch. 1), Rustow (1967) and Connor (1994: ch. 4).

[10](#) On diasporas, see Cohen (1997). In fact, most *ethnies* reside in their own territories, but in the premodern past these were often not bordered. Other *ethnies* were both resident in an ancestral homeland and scattered, as was the case with some of the Ottoman *millet*s; see Armstrong (1982: ch. 7).

[11](#) For this more neutral revised definition of the concept of 'nation', see A. D. Smith (2002), which replaces my earlier more 'modernist' definitions in A. D. Smith (1986, 1991). See also Motyl (1999: chs 4–5).

[12](#) It is not simply that nations are a delocalized and politicized form of *ethnie*, as Akzin (1964) has claimed; *ethnies* may, after all, be quite extensive and populous, and may be organized in political form, as ethnic states. Rather, what differentiates the nation from the *ethnie* is the attachment of its members to a (perceived) historic homeland, the presence of a distinct public culture, and the general observance of common laws and customs. For an elaboration of these points, see A. D. Smith (2000a: ch. 3), and ch. 5 below.

[13](#) For the role of modern diaspora communities in international politics, see Sheffer (1986); and on the modern, multilocal Armenian diaspora, see Panossian (2000).

[14](#) Here, we may distinguish two kinds of 'failed' nationalism: a failure of an ethnic category or *ethnie* to develop a strong nationalist movement; and a failure of that nationalism to achieve its political goals. Occitanians or Copts might be given as examples of the former failure, while Kurds and Tamils would (to date) exemplify the latter kind of 'failure'. See A. D. Smith (1983: ch. 9).

[15](#) For the term 'state-nation', see Zartmann (1964). Horowitz (1985: ch. 2) describes the effects for ethnic groups of the new territorial boundaries created by colonial powers.

[16](#) This is the approach taken by Fishman (1980) in his original analysis of the profound bonds of ethnicity and language in Eastern Europe, which in his view modernist approaches tend to obscure. For a critique, see A. D. Smith (1998: 159–61).

[17](#) The need for this kind of intergenerational analysis is the central point made by John Armstrong (1982: ch. 1) and by historical ethno-symbolists in general.

Ideologies

It is often said that nationalism has no ideology to speak of, let alone a doctrine. It is only a bundle of inchoate sentiments, elaborated by more or less florid rhetoric. Alternatively, we are told that there are too many kinds of nationalism to enable us to isolate and pin down an overall, coherent ideology. These are, at best, half-truths. Nationalism may be characterized by ‘philosophical poverty and even incoherence’ (Anderson 1991: 5) when compared to other ideologies. But there is more to it than mere sentiment and rhetoric, as Elie Kedourie (1960), no defender of nationalism, demonstrated through his analysis of the Herderian and Kantian philosophical assumptions of German Romantic nationalism. Nationalist ideologies have well-defined goals of collective self-rule, territorial unification and cultural identity, and often a clear political and cultural programme for achieving these ends. And while there are certainly different kinds of nationalist ideology – religious, secular, conservative, radical, imperial, secessionist and so on – each of which needs to be analysed, they reveal common basic elements and are stamped with an identical hallmark: the singular pursuit of nationhood. The common elements mark out ‘nationalism’ from other kinds of movement and ideology; by isolating the common elements of the ‘belief-system’ that underpins the various kinds of nationalist ideologies, movements and symbolisms, we may also be able to explain some of the regularities of behaviour that we encounter in nationalist movements and ‘activity’.¹

These common elements of the nationalist belief-system are of three main kinds:

- (1) a set of basic propositions to which most nationalists adhere, and flowing from them;
- (2) some fundamental ideals which are present in every nationalism, albeit in varying degrees; and
- (3) a range of cognate concepts that give more concrete meaning to the core abstractions of nationalism.

I shall take each of these in turn.

The basic propositions of nationalism are few but far-reaching. They can be summarized as follows:

- (1) the world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny;
- (2) the nation is the sole source of political power;
- (3) loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties;
- (4) to be free, every individual must belong to a nation;
- (5) every nation requires full self-expression and autonomy;
- (6) global peace and justice require a world of autonomous nations. (See Kedourie 1960: 1; cf. A. I. Smith 1991: 74)

We might call this the ‘core doctrine’ of nationalism. It forms the basic framework of the nationalist vision of the world, and (with perhaps the exception of the last proposition) embodies the common elements in the views of the ‘founding fathers’ of nationalism – Rousseau, Herder, Zimmermann, Burke, Jefferson, Fichte and Mazzini – as well as of their contemporary followers. The core doctrine provides the rationale and impetus for the various kinds of nationalist activity, as well as for the symbols and institutions that express the idea of the nation. It encompasses not only the domain

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