WHITE WOMAN SPEAKS WITH FORKED TONGUE
CRITICISM AS AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Nicole Ward Jouve
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The style of a broad range of feminist criticism debate and biographies is her own. Judgments are among some of the most challenging ideas.

Purpose, the works of Doris Lessing, between the absurdity of scientific knowledge and the methods and meanings at the core of new cultural and significant fields. Nicole Ward Jouve is Professor of English and Related Literature at the University of York. She is author of Shades of Grey (1981), The Street-Cleaner: The Yorkshire Ripper Case on Trial (1986), Phoebus: A Fire in Covent Garden (1980) and Gristle (1987).
WHITE WOMAN SPEAKS WITH FORKED TONGUE

Criticism as Autobiography

Nicole Ward Jouve

London and New York
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Preface: White Woman Speaks with Forked Tongue

No one who writes today can or should forget their race and their gender. The T who has written this book is white; privileged, yes, middle class, yes, and everything it has to say is limited and coloured by unconscious western European assumptions.

Since I chose the title for this book I have come to New England. The place and its history have reawakened an awareness that had been born many years ago, when I was living in western Canada in the midst of a “Red Power” movement. White man speaks with forked tongue. The colonists are ancestors, who, for the past four centuries, wave upon wave, landed on the shores of the non-European parts of the earth, brought violence and desolation wherever they went. I belong to the race that has taken a few centuries only to destroy or threaten what it had taken God or nature millions of years to make.

Critical writing has grown in the same period. Who knows but that it is tainted with the same greed, the same tendency to exploit and to destroy. Today, in our infinite appetite for exoticism, for the new, we go on gleefully sacking all other cultures to find something exciting to write about.

The white settlers that spread into New England or Canada had two ways of speaking with forked tongue: one was deliberate; they promised one thing and delivered another. Sadly, when they meant well, were not necessarily trying to plunder and steal, they often did worse than when they were just being greedy. The notions of property that their treaties embodied had nothing to do with the Indians’ concepts of ownership. The laws of the ten peoples were different. The colonists were granted the use of a place; they thought it
ment the right to settle and exploit and enclose the land. The illnesses they brought with their religion wiped out the populations that their settlements hadn’t starved out of existence.

Perhaps every white person should affix an authorial health warning to their texts. Something indeed like ‘white woman speaks with forked tongue’. It’s not because you are aware of a danger, nor because you mean well, that your words or actions do no harm. I’d say, etc. Writing is never innocent. White writing is less innocent than any other. As Gayatri Spivak has said, every First World woman’s book is typed out on a word processor made cheap by the low-paid labour of a Third World woman. Nathalie Sarraute used to say that the novel was in an era of suspicion. Today, the politics of white interpretation is in an era of far worse suspicion.

There is an appropriate honesty, however, in working on writing out of the here and the now. In all its ordinariness and modesty, I am glad on reflection that the essays that follow have such a homely pitch. If we cannot make something out of what we are, out of what we know, how shall we ever cease to colonize others? What else today but whatever wisdom we discover in our own lives do we have to give them?

White. But also woman.

As such, insecure in relation to most of the value systems that regulate culture. Wanting to be both whore and madonna. Both good and bad. Traditional and modern. To be a wide-eyed mother, and to shake up the establishment. Drawn to the feminist image, still attached to the feminine mystique. Wanting to be loved for both. And in permanent trouble on account of both.

To make matters even more divisive, both French and English.

White woman speaks with forked tongue: this writer writes in two languages, and about literature in two languages.

White woman speaks with forked tongue: this writer wants to find out, through writing, why she writes. She writes fiction as well as criticism. The two seep into each other. She writes as academic, sneaking towards theory, and as woman. Sometimes she allows everything she is to filter through into...
writing, and then she becomes frightened of what she's done, and she pushes it under. And the voice that grapples with reality cozes into the texts that try to be at one remove, the structures that the critical voice has erected.

The essays that follow have emerged from these manifold divisions. Over a period of time, eight years or so, it has become increasingly clear that only by allowing my voice to fork, by letting the autobiographical or the fictional surface into my thinking about something else, somebody else, by diversifying and personalizing the discourse, letting the French interfere with the English, do I ever manage to be at all adequate to the occasion, or true to myself. It seemed a pity that what had developed into a genuine practice, one that had its own logic and purpose, and could be useful to others else in search of a different voice, a more inclusive and exploratory way of writing about literature or women's issues, should be scattered all over the place. This book is an attempt to put it together.

Forked tongues are, after all, rooted in one throat. And the servant has ever been the friend of woman . . .

**NOTE**

1 As the man says in Toni Morrison's *Tar Baby*. 

Grateful thanks are given to the various publishing houses for their kind permission to reprint the articles.

I also wish to tender thanks to the many people who have helped me, read me, listened to me, advised me in what amounts to eight years of critical writing. They cannot all be listed, but they are all in my mind and heart. Special thanks are due to Jenny Taylor for encouraging me to develop my own voice whilst writing on Lessing, and to the whole American group of Lessing fans who edit the Doris Lessing Newsletter.
for being so wonderfully involved and inspirational - Ellen Croman Rose, Cary Kaplan and Claire Spivigne in particular. To Michelle Roberts for her exquisite grace and generosity. Rosie Jackson for being so true and uncompromising, Clare Hanson for her enthusiasm and creative thoughtfulness, Susan Sullen for her generous and joyful supportiveness. To all the people who’ve asked me to give the papers out of which these essays have grown, and who have responded creatively to them. To Gerard de Cortanze for inviting me to think about Woolf, David Bellis and Gillian Beer and Miriam Diaz-Diocarrez and Alice Parker and Elizabeth Meese about writing and bilingualism, Jane Attol and Helen Camb and Nikki Gerrard and Muri Dooley about French feminism and to Françoise Van Rossen-Cuyten and Helen Wilson and Ann Thompson about Cixous. And . . . and . . . And to Jules Chametzky and the Institute for the Advanced Study in the Humanities at the University of Massachusetts. Amherst, for giving me the final institutional map de passe.
Introduction: criticism as autobiography

It is odd. There is now a massive and sophisticated body of criticism on autobiography. Autobiography as practice as well as theory. How pervasive it is. How thorough the self is invented, constructed, projected. Or remains poised on the threshold. Yet it never seems to occur to the critics who say such wise things that they themselves, through writing, may be in the process of inventing or projecting their own selves. The critical genre, it seems, makes its adepts feel that they are being miraculously transported on a magic carpet from which they can survey, or peer into, the operations of the rest of mankind, the common herd of writers as it were. They themselves are removed from the obligation of having to bother with the self that writes. They inhabit a secure, objectified, third-person mode that protects them from having to be self-aware.

In the sixties and seventies, the so-called New Continental Criticism launched an attack on the notion that a literary or poetic consciousness is in any way a privileged consciousness. We now know, Paul de Man explained, that literary language is shot through with the same duplicities as everyday language, and that social language, in its turn, sets elaborate rhetorical devices into play so as to avoid naming the 'Unnameable': 'unmediated expression is a philosophical impossibility'. The contemporary contribution to this age old problem, de Man went on to argue, is that the observing subject of a distant society, for instance, now knows that prior to making any valid statement, he must be as clear as possible about his attitude towards his own. 'He' (de Man goes on, presumably using he as a universal).
will soon discover . . . that the only way he can accomplish this self-demystification is by a (comparative) study of his own social self as it engages in the observation of others . . . . The observation and interpretation of others is always also a means of leading to the observation of the self: true anthropological knowledge (in the ethnological as well as in the philosophical, Kantian sense of the term) can only become worthy of being called knowledge when this alternating process of mutual interpretation between the two subjects has run its course.

Physician de Man cures himself of the need to swallow his own medicine by arguing that the complexities of the pull between observing and observed subject are such when you enter the areas of politics or psychoanalysis or indeed literature, that the critic has to adopt a combination of rational methodology and critical self-vigilance to save himself from the dizziness that threatens. Why, unlike Barthes, he could not write a *de Man par lui-même*, or, as Philippe Lejeune was to do, alternate between reflection and practice, de Man does not really explain. I think it needs explaining. I agree when he says that the road to knowledge goes through self-knowledge. And that anyone today trying to reflect on others without awareness of the reflecting subject is a new kind of Candide. But then why do contemporary critics, whether they lean towards science or towards philosophy, think that their discipline is the only one in which the subject of the observer, the pull of desire or the relativity principle do not have to be taken into consideration? Are there ways of writing that are not autobiographical in the most complex sense?

I am in the University Library in Cambridge, in the Reading Room, waiting for a book on the Lady with the Alligator, someone has put a reservation slip, now four days old, inside a book called *Reading Nietzsche*. It is a volume of essays, edited by Jeffrey Paul. I open at the first pages. It describes the favourable reception of Nietzsche's book, *Beyond Good and Evil*. I read: That's a treatise extolling the virtues of eighteenth-century individualism and nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism should not have excited either hostility or silence, is both a puzzling and gratifying phenomenon, puzzling because its
themes run counter to the Zeitgeist and gratifying because it is a work of considerable acuity.'

I know nothing about Nazi. Nothing about the author of this sentence. A picture of him however rises in my mind. A bit pompous, 'extolling'. Confident. Feels he's got the wind in his sail. 961. mind you Thatcher's star on the rise. Reagan in the US. Moneterism. individualism. liberalism. Socialism is getting ratted. But oh, let's not show our hand too clearly, let's pretend it's all happening through the power of good minds. Nazi for one, pattering through the clouds of the welfare state and all the mumbo jumbo that goes with it. Is Jeffrey one of the old young men, the new philosophers? Pushing their smartly sucked feet into the shoes of the old duds. Negativism. Nazi's treatise should not have elicited either hostility or silence where he could have said 'should have been so well-received'. Binary balances, and in the process of writing them, he delights in his own capacity for classical elegance, ironic undertaker, eighteenth century individualism... nineteenth-century laissez-faire capitalism... hostility or silence... puzzling and gratifying. Let's pretend we don't know what we are doing. A look in the tooth for all that metaphysical foreign stuff, that German neo-Marxist Frankfurt School rubbish. 'counter to the Zeitgeist'. An endearing appearance of modesty: we do not glory over the success of our ideas, we are puzzled. We did not think that the signs of the times were so visible. There's hope yet for the regeneration of the old West. Competition and all that. Dog eat dog. Tough on the misfits. But there you are: society cannot thrive unless its elite, the people with 'acuity', carry the day. The elite are gratified. We are gratified.

The author here is conveying some information about Nazi's ideas and a waxing ideology. Above all, with his elaborate third person, his disguised glee about the rise of the ideas he is 'extolling', and his disappearance into the consensus of the elite, he says a lot about himself. How much more likeable he would be if he were able to say: 'I want to defend property. And privilege. I'm sick of state control, heavy taxation, egalitarianism. It's about time the likes of me went on to the offensive. Let's pick up the discourses that argue for what I want. Look at Nazi. There's the man. Going down well too.' With a bit more self-awareness he would have said:
Why do I want to defend property, exalt privilege? Because I want them both. I don't want the vulgar peas to have a share of the cake they did nothing to make. I want my energies and appetites to be uninhibited. And with yet a bit more self-questioning: Why do I want all this? Is it that the mood is about? That I am successful, but don't reap enough rewards? That I am not successful enough? That my father, my mother, did not give me what I wanted? That I resent being preached at? And so it would go.

But, you will say, we don't want to know about this man. This impossibly boring confessional stuff. We want to know about Nozick.

Why do you want to know?

Fair enough. Read Nozick. Agree with him. Or with Stuart Hall.

But don't forget to ask yourself why you do agree with whoever it is you find yourself in agreement with.

(Was it that I was in a great library? I suddenly thought of Virginia Woolf in A Room of One’s Own, reading piles of books written by men about women and perceiving one thing only in what she read: anger.)

There is, of course, another way to do what the sentence about Nozick did:

'The talking about you-know-who', Valerie explained... 'Torture, Maggie the Bitch.' Oh, 'She's radical all right. What she wants - what she actually thinks she can f**king achieve - is literally to invent a whole goddam middle-class in this country. Get rid of the old, woolly incompetent buggers from fucking Surrey and Hampshire, and bring in the new. People without background, without history. Hungry people. People who really want, and who know that with her, they can bloody well get... And it's not just the businessmen... The intellectuals too. Out with the whole faggotry crew. In with the hungry guys with the wrong education. New professors, new professors, the lot. It's a bloody revolution. Newness coming into this country that's stuffed full of old impses.'

I'm sure readers have recognized Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
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Venus. This says the reverse of the Nausik. Hostility to the new ethos is voiced through dramatic irony, almost pastiche. The fiction here functions as criticism. It is also autobiographical, in that through the burlesque enthusiasm of Vanence, and the punch-drunk wonder of his interlocutor, Chamela, one senses the author's distaste for the new greed and the narrator's glee as he smothers the hatchetite cat with cream. As a text shot through with autobiography, as I would claim that all texts are, the Rushdie fiction is infinitely more cunning and diverse than the overly objective critical piece. It produces a lot of things besides the inevitable account of self. What I want to claim is that to even approximate, or get so much towards the horizon of such richness, criticism must take autobiography into account. Only by daring to make the observing subject part and parcel of what critical observation is about, can criticism sail towards a three-dimensional land.

Thinking is not the management of thought, as always it is too often taken to mean these days. Thinking means putting everything on the line, taking risks, thinking risks, finding out what the actual odds are, not sheltering behind a pretext and in any case fallacious and transparent objectivity. Only when it actually thinks is criticism ever a form of writing. Only then is it a total commitment to language, the way a good joiner who makes a table will choose the best wood he or she can get, attempt to serve the wood well, use his or her skill to best effect, invest everything, body and knowledge, into what the old Composers used to call a masterpiece (which could also be a miswritten piece). What Gertrude Stein celebrated there was so little of. One may individually succeed or fail. The quality of the attempt is what creates a climate in which thought can thrive. In which the ethos which Rushdie satirizes can properly be challenged.

Not that each writer should splash his or her ego all over the page, like so many liquidized Gremlins. If all criticism became autobiography, it would not only become boring, it would defeat its purpose. Criticism is about the other. Its drive for an objective voice is a search for a consensual voice and an attempt at openness. Let the ego be quiet so that the other can be seen. The drive is also for an absolute. However relativistic, however studded with 'seems' or aware of rival positions the critical discourse may be, it aims at truth — in
the Thomist sense, as the adequation of mind to the thing. Criticism that would be primarily preoccupied with self would be narcissistic, forget about the thing over there.

Then, you will say (and George May has said), why this idolatry for autobiography? Isn't it, as Philippe Lejeune owns it is for him, a disguised desire to write? Why should everyone else do it? There is plenty of the stuff about as it is. Literary criticism in any case is better deployed when it is self-forgetful. Its business is indeed to read between the lines, to detect the personal where it lurks among the other elements at play in the text. Any critic or autobiographer worth his or her salt will do it. Take, for instance, Jonathan Raban's recent interpretation of the speech given by the Prime Minister to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh (Saturday 21 May 1988) in his excellent pamphlet God, Man and Mrs Thatcher. He poignantly points of the 'the independence of mind and vigour of thought' of the Scottish people, commenting that 'her account of the foundation of the church of Scotland has a curious doubleness to it, as if, in describing the institution, she was also sketching a thumbnail self-portrait' (pp. 21-2). And he proceeds to read the speech as a piece of incipient, proselytizing autobiography.

And so (you might go on to say), since good criticism detects the autobiographical anyway, why land us in a less memorable world in which the critic paints himself or herself into a picture full of mirrors reflecting backwards and forwards, the real sitter as chance intruder, the children or ladies-in-waiting or animals or onlookers as the pretend subjects of the painting? If Jonathan Raban were to tell us in his turn why he writes in the way he does about Mrs Thatcher, he would weaken his case, water down his polemic. I would want to suggest that had he been a woman critic he might have chosen to run that risk, and that the result might not necessarily have been weakness. I would also want to add that it is one of the great strengths of some feminist criticism in recent years that it has precisely been prepared to take that risk. But more of this anon. I would also concede that there is truth in the structure, and that pamphlet or satire may not be the place for soul-searching. (Although I would add that the more powerful satire will come from the writer with the greater self-knowledge, one who has struggled to arrive at strongly held
opinions.) But it is true that when you're on the attack, you're not going to turn confessional.

Indeed, this piece is one I am writing now, though I do say 'I', is not overly autobiographical, since I want to challenge and persuade. I do know, however, where it comes from: from years in which I failed to reconcile the ability I had developed to say apparently astute things about texts, in imitation or application of various discourses I had picked up, and what (as Woody Allen might say) I was really about, what I thought life was for, what I knew about other people or about myself. If you cannot ever add up, if you cannot say, 'This is what I think and this is why I think it', you are not being a critic. Though I use him for a purpose he would not have liked, I agree with de Man when he claims that criticism is linked with crisis. In periods that are not periods of crisis, or in individuals bent upon avoiding crisis at all cost, there can be all sorts of approaches to literature: historical, philological, psychological, etc., but there can be no criticism.\(^7\)

De Man is arguing for awareness of the universal crisis in language, saying that to avoid becoming aware of it is as if historians refused to acknowledge the existence of wars because they threaten to interfere with the security that is indispensable to an orderly pursuit of their discipline. What he said in the late sixties has become true again in the late eighties. I am however arguing almost for the reverse, it on the basis of the same analysis. Not for an awareness of the essentially mediated condition of language, the impossibility of arriving at subjecthood, but for the need to speak as a subject, and as a subject bent on self-knowledge. We have lost ourselves in the endlessly distracted light of Deconstruction. I say 'we' meaning all of us, but especially women. For we have been asked to go along with Deconstruction whilst we had not even got to the Construction stage. You must have a self before you can assert to deconstruct it, and it strikes me that in the world of today it is very much more difficult to find or create a voice, add up mind and discourse, than to enter the proliferating ways, be they inside or outside, of excess, that open up from the infinitely evasive subject. So let me be unashamedly unmodest and old-fashioned and quote from the early lectures, as translated by Ian Fairley:
we are talking here about the schemata of experience, whose true generality has concealed at the very heart of experience: any writing that seeks to communicate these schemata must not deny them: this experiential depth ... truly profound subjectivity (which by no means implies surrender to triviality) demonstrates laws that are genuinely positive and practical in nature.

Or take Gramsci. 'The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the historical process to date,' isn't it now to have some of the Marxists with you (even though they are the eccentric ones, or these are eccentric passages) when you want to argue for the importance of self-knowledge, or rather the quest for self-knowledge, in the writing of criticism? Not only because Marxism has, through some of its practitioners, often been used to excuse the self as some culpable extraneous, but because it's good to be reminded that there are good material (physical, economical, historical) reasons for covering it in. These reasons endure. Unless criticism springs out of genuine analyses of the real world, and is its turn, affects it (and in the word 'real' I include the self that lives out of and in history as well as writers), then it inhabits the realm of fantasy. It perpetuates a sterile state of fantasy, like cogs that no longer clutch into the cogs of a wheel and turn in the void, and with their own unimpeded speed.

The mess arising out of The Sinic Verses recently has shown how divorced the critical intelligence had become from reality. There has been a vast distance between the violence triggered by the book (evidencing however paradoxically, the power of the Word) and the inability of the countless commentators (with some notable exceptions) to say anything truly apposite.

The cult of the new, in the past twenty years, has been a sign of vitality: it has also done a great deal of harm. The pace of consumption has been too fast, generating panic, the constant need for more, the greed to be stimulated and to absorb and digest and move on. And so, the old and the not-so-old have been drawn upon to fuel the machine. It has often been a theory machine. Often tied from abroad, the Central Europeans, the Russians, the French. The critic has tried to imitate, refute or apply whichever model he or she found most
attractive. You could almost say, returning to de Man, that the critics of what he calls ‘crisis’, the genuine critics, have been turned by managers into ‘approaches to literature’.

Pretend that there isn’t a war on. Take theory and make more in the same vein. Alternately, take theory and apply it to the text. If you do this, you will be regarded as a serious, a what is called ‘professional’, person. Let us not forget what ‘professional’ means if you are a woman. Let us not make profit out of other people’s truths. Far better to say, ‘a poor thing, but my own’. If you emulate and follow and apply, you nauseate: what you follow. The mistake we make when we choose a model, Anaïs Nin said, is that we choose the point of arrival. The only way in which you can be genuinely stimulated and fed by discourses you admire or find congenial is if you dare combine a voice of your own. Then you will understand why for you it is Kristeva rather than Žižek, Spivak rather than Derrida, Balduino rather than Barthes.

It is not because criticism is your craft that you are removed from the obligation that is, or ought to be, upon every writer, to go to the end and the fullness of what writing can be for her or him. I had rather have Baudelaire’s ‘Phares’, lighthouses answering each other through the darkness, as an image of the way artists dialogue through the ages, than Bloom’s fathers-and-sons ‘anxiety of influence’ model. As a woman, not only do you not know where to enter this fathers-and-sons game, you also know that you are not just a daughter, you are potentially, if not in effect, a mother too. You may be a learner, you may not be so clever or so gifted as those you admire, it does not mean that you should turn into their exquisite. You may be only a little lighthouse, your small light making safe a tiny reef or corner of the coast. That is still better than stealing a flame from the big house and going round the foot of the tower proudly shining your torch on bits of rock that the big beast had given warning of anyway. And you can go to the lighthouse, become your own lighthouse, only if you recognize that, however different your craft and your skills and your object, you are still in the same business as the critics themselves. The business of making sense of life, which means as a first step making sense of yourself.

But (you might say) what you propose is incredibly naive. Contemporary theory has problematized the subject in
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... manifold ways, ways that preclude the search for the self that you propose. Psychoanalysis would demonstrate to you, through I in particular, that 'I' is always another, first grasped as an image. And what about the unconscious, the divided self and all that? Self-knowledge is a mirage, a hangover from the Greeks. And you speak about the autobiographical voice as if there was such a thing, as if the prodigious wealth of recent studies on autobiography, first male then female, hadn't endlessly questioned its existence as a genre. Is it form? Is it content? Is it a mixed genre? An inferior genre? Necessarily ruptured and discontinuous? Does it involve a contract with the name of the author? Is it meant to make a fallacious whole of the disparate elements of the personality? To separate, or to connect, private and public self? How can you so glibly assume that by saying 'I' you will somehow make everything add up?

I take the point. It is no easier to say 'I' than to make theory. The construction of relations, of sense, is infinitely hard, whichever way you go at it. Yes, 'I', today, is perhaps more problematical than it has ever been. I say 'perhaps' thinking of Montaigne, who has always been a great love and a source of strength to me. Here is a man who went from a third-person voice and would-be philosophical debates and critical commentaries on the texts of others to his own script. A full turn in his life, making loss of consciousness totally pointless, seeing the natural stoicism with which country people tell around him were dying of the plague, changed his whole manner of thinking about death, made years of meditations on philosophy at one remove irrelevant. He no longer thought of the forces of the mind should be deployed to learn to die, but it slowly and through growing accustomed to a sceptical view of things: 'Most avis que c'est le bref, non le but de la vie.' Death as the end, not the aim, of life. 'Essaying' his faculties, directly relating what he was, found himself to be, what he perceived as he discovered, to the great texts he had become familiar with, became his object. Or his subject.

An exercise. The creation of self through process and relationship.

In any case, as I have tried to show at the outset, any writing constructs and betrays a subject. It is not a question of choice. One might as well make something of the process. It is not
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